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“If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report
and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open
accession negotiations with Turkey without delay ”
Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, December 2002
With this decision, European Heads of State and Government for 
the first time offered Turkey a concrete prospect of accession
negotiations, more than four decades after its application for
association with the European Economic Community in July 1959.
Europe’s leaders were motivated by the impressive reforms Turkey
had undertaken following its recognition as a candidate state at
Helsinki in December 1999. Since then, the Turkish Government 
has further intensified its efforts to transform the country into a
modern, participatory democracy and to fulfil all aspects of the
Copenhagen political criteria. It can justifiably be said that Turkey 
is undergoing a “silent revolution”, even if the speed of the process
means that it will take time until the effects are felt in all parts of
Turkish society and widely recognised by public opinion outside 
the country.
The European Council’s 1999 and 2002 decisions on Turkish
accession were in line with official positions taken repeatedly by
European governments in the preceding forty years. Never was
Turkey’s eligibility for membership openly put into doubt. On the
contrary, it was explicitly confirmed on many occasions; but Turkey
was told at the same time that prevailing political and economic
conditions did not allow accession negotiations to begin. The
consistent message from European governments was therefore 
that Turkey would be welcome in the Union, the date of accession
depending solely on the fulfilment of membership criteria.
It is perhaps no coincidence that fundamental questions 
began to be raised only after the country had been formally 
declared a candidate state, turning accession from distant prospect
into realistic possibility. The approaching 2004, involving an
unprecedented number of mainly Central European states,
meanwhile revived the debate on the Union’s future and purpose.
Discussions of “European identity”and “the limits of Europe”
stimulated awareness of some of the challenges associated with
Turkish membership.
Over the past few years public opinion in several countries 
has become markedly sceptical at the prospect of a large state like
Turkey joining the Union, situated as it is on the fringes of Europe,
with an overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic
conditions well below the European average. In the often-heated
debate many arguments have been raised. Some reflect genuine
problems; others are of a more emotional nature.
Nobody can deny that Turkish accession would have
considerable economic, institutional and societal implications,
both for the European Union and for Turkey itself. An extensive
discussion of these issues was therefore legitimate
and timely. The equally undeniable opportunities
connected with Turkish membership should,
however, also be taken into account, as should the
potential costs for the European Union if Turkey’s
aspiration were to be rejected. Clichés or sweeping
statements abound, purporting that Turkey is not
a European country or that its membership would
mean the end of the European Union. Some raise the spectre of a
Muslim invasion of Europe destroying its culture and civilisation.
To facilitate constructive discourse on this complex issue, such
approaches should be avoided.
The accession process could be accompanied by an increasingly
acrimonious public debate should the European Council agree 
later this year to the opening of negotiations. There is a danger of
a rift between government positions and public opinion in parts 
of Europe, which would not augur well for the ratification of an
eventual accession treaty. In this context, the positions of the
European Parliament will be of particular importance.
In these circumstances, a group of concerned Europeans, deeply
committed to the integration process and having held high public
office, formed an Independent Commission on Turkey in March
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2004. Their purpose was to examine the major challenges and
opportunities connected with Turkey’s possible accession to the
Union. They met regularly for intensive discussions, visited Turkey
and analysed expertise from various sources. Close contact was
maintained with European institutions. The Independent
Commission’s work programme did not include issues under review
by the European Commission for its forthcoming Progress Report
on Turkey.
This report presents the findings of the Independent
Commission on Turkey, which are the personal views of its
members. The Commission hopes to contribute to a more objective
and rational debate on Turkey’s accession to the European Union,
which is rightly considered one of the major challenges for Europe
in the coming years.
“The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its 
values and are committed to promoting them together”
Article 1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
The conditions for membership of the European Union are set out 
in this provision and similar wordings contained in earlier treaties,
beginning with the Treaty of Rome of 1957. A state must be
“European”. It must adhere to the Union’s values enumerated in
Article 2 of the constitutional treaty, namely “respect for human
dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights”. Furthermore, the Copenhagen European Council
established concrete criteria in 1993 covering political and
institutional aspects, the economy and obligations of membership
including the aims of a political, economic and monetary union.
One element of the Copenhagen criteria may be of particular
relevance for the timing of Turkish accession:“The Union’s capacity
to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of
European integration, is also an important consideration in the
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”.
Finally, Article 1 of the Constitutional Treaty must be
interpreted as giving candidate countries a claim to accession once
all necessary conditions obtain, rather than making it a favour to be
granted by present members.
The answer to this question depends on a variety of factors:
geography, culture, history, the choices made by Turkey itself and 
the acceptance of other European countries.
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After the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s territory
was reduced to the point where only 3% fell within continental
Europe. However, 11% of the Turkish population as well as Turkey’s
economic and cultural capital, Istanbul, are to be found within that
space. Turkey lies clearly on the dividing line between Europe and
Asia, its territory forming part of both continents. Whereas Europe’s
borders to the north, west and south are undisputed, those to the east
and south-east remain fluid and open to interpretation. It is obvious
that geography alone cannot provide an answer.
Turks entered Anatolia in the eleventh century and gradually
established the Ottoman Empire, leading to the conquest of
Constantinople in 1453. They became heirs not only to Byzantine
and the Eastern Roman Empire, but also to a rich
Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian culture in Anatolia.
Names such as the ‘father of history’, Herodotus of
Halicarnass; Aesop, who inspired La Fontaine’s fables;
Lucullus, the patron of gourmets; Saint Nicholas,
bishop of Myra and ancestor of our Father Christmas;
and Croesus, who became the richest man of his time, are connected
with this region, as are places like Troy, Pergamon, Ephesus, and
Mount Ararat where Noah’s Ark came to rest. Saint Peter preached to
the first Christian community in Antioch. Tarsus was the birthplace
of Saint Paul, who made his first missionary journey to Anatolia,
extending Christianity beyond the limits of Judaism and thereby
laying the foundations of a worldwide religion. All this reminds us
that the region which today is the heart of Turkey was one of the
cradles of European civilisation.
For the greater part of its history, the Ottoman Empire was an
important factor of European politics, often acting as conqueror,
like most European powers, and sometimes in close alliance with
major European countries such as France. At other times the Empire
became a safe haven for Europe’s oppressed and persecuted, as in
1492 when thousands of Jewish refugees from Spain were given
shelter. This reflected the traditions of the Ottoman Empire, where
different religious communities lived together side by side, granted -
in return for their loyalty - rights and privileges going beyond the
Koranic requirement to treat the other ‘Peoples of the Book’
(Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians) with special tolerance. The
Ottoman Empire was so much part of European history that in 1856,
at the end of the Crimean war, the Sublime Porte was invited to join
the ‘European Concert’ deciding Europe’s destiny, alongside Austria,
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Sardinia and Russia.
This recognition of Turkey as a European power coincided with
major efforts by successive Sultans to ‘westernise’ their realm, begun
at the start of the nineteenth century with the purpose of instilling 
new vigour into a declining empire. These reforms, strongly inspired 
by France, led to the abolition of typical Ottoman institutions,
the modernisation of the army, a centralisation of the state
administration, the establishment of a postal service and of an
Ottoman Bank printing paper money for the first time, compulsory
primary education including the founding of the Galatasaray school
teaching in French, the teaching of modern medicine and 
the adoption of new civil and penal codes. It is no coincidence that
reforms petered out after the defeat of France by Prussia in 1871 
and that a reaction affirmed the Islamic character of the empire 
to the detriment of westernisation. The period of reform had
nevertheless profoundly changed the empire, even if not all of its
aims were achieved.
In the following years it was again influence from Europe,
in particular from France and England, that inspired the ‘Young
Ottomans’ movement to propose a constitutional government 
and openly to raise questions of liberty and the political rights of
citizenship. The idea of a ‘fatherland’ (Turks prefer ‘motherland’)
meanwhile emerged, splitting the loyalties that traditionally had
belonged to the Sultan alone. Confronted with a strong reaction 
by the ruler, the Young Ottomans eventually withdrew from the
political scene to constitute the first liberal opposition of sorts,
preparatory to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.
Their ideal of liberty survived and was taken up by the ‘Young Turks’,
who – supported by the westernised officer elite – chose the path of
revolution. They too, like other political movements of the time,
were strongly influenced by European schools of philosophy and
sociology. The lasting achievement of the Young Turks was to initiate
the process of building a Turkish national identity combined with a
consistent westernisation, which they considered indispensable for
Turkey’s survival.
These were the conceptual underpinnings of the reforms
undertaken by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk following the break-up 
of the Ottoman Empire and his successful fight for national
independence. Ataturk wished to turn his country into a modern
and civilised state. For him and reformist Turks, civilisation meant
western civilisation:“Peoples who are not civilised are condemned
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to remain under the domination of those who are. And civilisation is
the West, the modern world, of which Turkey must be part if she
wishes to survive. The nation is determined to adopt exactly and
completely, both in substance  and in form, the way of life and the
methods which contemporary civilisation offers to all nations.”
Ataturk’s reforms included the abolition of the Sultanate,
Califate and Ulema, the renunciation of Sharia law, the adoption of
a new Civil Code modelled on that of Switzerland, the replacement
of the Arabic by the Roman alphabet, the elimination
of words of Arabian and Persian origin, the switch
from the lunar to the solar calendar, the substitution
of Friday by Sunday as a day of rest, and the granting
of political rights to women. These measures should
not be misunderstood as aiming at the elimination of
Islam and Islamic values altogether from Turkish society. Ataturk’s
project was to terminate the political functions of Islam and the
powers of religious institutions in Turkish law and justice, turning
religion into a matter of personal conscience; and in this he was
successful. With his reforms, Turkey began to develop into a modern
secular state.
The Council of Europe, guardian of European values and principles,
admitted Turkey as full member in August 1949 only a few months
after the Treaty of London had been signed. It judged that the
Turkish Republic fulfilled its two conditions for membership – 
to be a European country and to respect human rights, pluralistic
democracy and the rule of law. On the latter questions, the Turkish
constitution contained the necessary guarantees.
The question of Turkey’s European credentials was never raised,
the strategic interest to firmly integrate Turkey in the western camp
during the Cold War being the overriding factor at the time. In 1951
Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and
became a cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic defence system. It also
acceded to the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC, later OECD), the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Turkey today is a full
member of all major Europe-wide institutions, the European Union
being the sole exception.
In 1959, Turkey applied for associated membership of the
European Economic Community (EEC). After a delay caused by the
Turkish military coup of 1960, the Ankara Agreement of association
was signed in 1963. Article 28 contains a cautiously worded
perspective of membership:“As soon as the operation of this
Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full
acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty
establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine
the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community”.
The main thrust of the agreement was the gradual establishment
of a customs union, which in accordance with details set out in the
Additional Protocol of 1970 was to be finalised after a period of 22
years. An Association Council was tasked to examine at regular
intervals progress made in implementing the Ankara Agreement.
After several delays, the customs union entered into force only in
1996. It led to a wide-ranging abolition of customs duties and quotas,
without achieving the free movement of people, services and capital
originally envisaged.
On 14 April 1987, Turkey submitted an application for
membership to the European Community (EC). It took the
European Commission until December 1989 to produce an Opinion,
approved by the European Council two months later,
refusing accession negotiations on several grounds.
It was pointed out that the Community itself was
undergoing major changes following the adoption of
the Single Act; it would therefore be inappropriate to
become involved in new accession negotiations at this
stage. Furthermore, the economic and political situation in Turkey,
including “the negative consequences of the dispute between Turkey
and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in
Cyprus” led the Commission to believe that it would not be useful 
to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away. The
Commission instead recommended a series of supporting measures
for Turkey,“without casting doubt on its eligibility for membership
of the Community.” Interestingly, an application for membership of
the EC submitted also in 1987 by Morocco was rejected out of hand
as coming from a non-European country.
During the following decade, Turkey’s eligibility for
membership was reconfirmed on many occasions by the European
Council, the General Affairs Council and in the Association Council.
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At the same time it was consistently pointed out that political and
economic problems, including Turkey’s human rights record,
remained obstacles to accession negotiations. This was the case in
particular at the Luxembourg European Council of 1997, when the
accession process was begun for the central and eastern European
countries and Cyprus, excluding Turkey.
A major breakthrough in Turkish relations with the European
Union took place at the Helsinki European Council of 10-11
December 1999, which concluded that “Turkey is a candidate State
destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied
to the other candidate States.”With this decision, Turkey was put
firmly on the track toward accession. An Accession Partnership,
annual Progress Reports by the European Commission and
preparatory Acquis Screenings were instituted, stimulating and
supporting Turkish reform efforts. The process of change received 
a strong impetus, leading the Brussels European Council in October
2002 to conclude:“Turkey has taken important steps towards
meeting the Copenhagen political criteria and moved forward on 
the economic criteria and alignment with the Acquis, as registered 
in the Commission’s Regular Report. This has brought forward the
opening of accession negotiations with Turkey.”The Union also
encouraged Turkey to pursue its reform efforts and to take further
concrete steps on implementation.
Two months later, in December 2002, the Copenhagen
European Council recognised the important progress achieved 
by Turkey in fulfilling the criteria for membership, pointing at the 
same time to remaining shortcomings in particular with regard to
implementation. In response to Turkey’s pressing demand for a date
for opening negotiations, the European Council decided to examine
in December 2004 whether Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political
criteria and if it does, to open accession negotiations without delay.
To assist Turkey towards membership the Accession Partnership 
was strengthened, significantly increasing pre-accession financial
assistance and the EC-Turkey customs union was extended and
deepened. Since the beginning of 2003 the Turkish Government 
has dramatically accelerated and intensified its reform efforts,
demonstrating its determination to fulfil the European Council’s
conditions.
Official declarations and decisions of European institutions
over the years convey an impression of great consistency: Turkey was
welcome to join the European Union as soon as it complied with all
membership criteria. But this hides the fact that several European
governments at times displayed ambiguity with regard to Turkey’s
European ambitions, raising doubts about Turkish membership.
A variety of arguments were deployed, ranging from the size and
socio-economic backwardness of the country and its poor human
rights record to the expected costs, the threat of uncontrolled
immigration or the extent to which the Union was institutionally
unprepared. However, the principal motive for hesitations – 
societal or cultural differences, used as euphemisms for the religious
dimension – was only mentioned with considerable reluctance.
In spite of such reservations, the strategic importance of Turkey 
for Europe and the overriding wish to preserve close relations won
out on every occasion, and every European government joined in
the consensus.
Turkey meanwhile never left any doubt as to its European
orientation. It has pursued full participation in the European
integration process with single-minded determination. Turks
complain with some justice about the persistence of negative
emotions with regard to their country, and the fact that the so-called
‘Crusader Spirit’ of centuries past has not fully disappeared today.
In the words of Ataturk,“The West has always been prejudiced
against the Turks, but we Turks have always consistently moved
towards the West.”
Today Turkish leaders are concerned that “the closer Turkey gets
to EU membership, the more the resistance grows in Europe.” In this
context, they tend to downplay the fact that some of the problems
connected with Turkish membership are both real and serious and
that many of the obstacles to an early accession are homegrown. It
was only after the momentous decisions of the European Council in
1999 on candidate status and in 2002 on accession negotiations that
the reform process moved into high gear. But the necessary measures
are now being undertaken by the Turkish Government with
















to secular democracy; it cannot simply be transferred to other
Islamic countries. The successful inclusion of Turkey in the
European integration process, however, would show the Islamic
world that it is indeed possible to find answers to the dilemma of
combining religious beliefs and traditions with the universally
accepted principles of modern societies.
At a time when the European Union is set to assume greater
responsibility in world politics, Turkish accession would
considerably strengthen the Union’s capabilities as foreign policy
actor. Both the European Union’s new security strategy,“A Secure
Europe in a Better World”(adopted in December
2003) and the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood”
concept developed by the European Commission and
the European Parliament put great emphasis on the
importance of the Southern periphery for European
security, stressing the need to project stability into the
continent’s neighbourhood. Due to its geo-strategic
position, Turkey would add new dimensions to the
Union’s foreign policy efforts in such vitally important regions as the
Middle East, the Mediterranean, Central Asia and South Caucasus.
In the Middle East, an area of special interest to Europe both for
historical reasons and because of its impact on European security,
the Union has much to gain in profile and status. Despite being the
largest provider of aid to the Palestinians and entertaining strong
commercial links with Israel and Arab states, Europe has only played
a modest part to date in the search for a solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. There are good arguments for a more effective
and assertive European role, without intention to challenge the
leadership of the United States of America in this complex issue.
Turkey entertains good relations with both sides and enjoys
credibility in Israel and the Arab world alike. Its membership would
no doubt increase the Union’s weight in the Middle East, which
could be put to good use in common efforts towards peacemaking
and stabilisation in this strategically critical region.
Similar opportunities present themselves in the Black Sea basin,
South Caucasus and Central Asia, where the European Union has
kept a low profile in the past, but Turkey, for reasons of geography,
culture, religion and language, has been an active player. As a party of
the “Barcelona Process”, Turkey, together with Malta and Cyprus,
could give much-needed impetus to thus far disappointing 
co-operation in the Mediterranean.
There can be no doubt that Turkey’s accession to the EU would
present both the Union and Turkey itself not only with serious
challenges, but also with considerable opportunities and benefits.
Moreover, the costs of rejecting Turkey’s request to join the Union
and other negative consequences must also be taken into
consideration.
Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide
undeniable proof that Europe is not a closed “Christian Club”.
It would confirm the Union’s nature as an inclusive and tolerant
society, drawing strength from its diversity and bound together by
common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights. In the great cultural debate of the twenty-first
century, all too often fuelled by ignorance and prejudice and 
misused by criminal phenomena such as international terrorism,
a multiethnic, multicultural and multifaith Europe could send 
a powerful message to the rest of the world that the “Clash of
Civilisations” is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind. Presenting
an alternative model to the exclusive, sectarian and closed society
propagated by radical Islamists, Europe could play an inestimable
role in future relations between the “West”and the Islamic world.
The Union would gain wide respect and credibility, enhancing its
“soft power” in many parts of the globe.
Turkish membership would further give evidence of the
compatibility of Islam and democracy. It is true that Turkey’s
experience is unique, based on diverse cultural roots, two centuries
of western orientation and Ataturk’s revolutionary transformation
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resources and a young, well-trained and highly qualified work force.
With a population of close to seventy million at present and its
purchasing power expected steadily to increase, Turkey’s potential as
a market for goods from EU member states will gain in importance.
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
following the emergence of the Caspian basin as one of the world’s
largest sources of oil and natural gas highlights Turkey’s role as a key
transit country for energy supplies. Moreover, Turkey’s geopolitical
position and close links with tens of millions of Turkic people in
neighbouring countries could help secure European access to the
enormous wealth of resources in Central Asia and regions of Siberia,
making Turkey a vital factor for Europe’s security of energy supplies
coming from the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and Russia. In this
context, Turkey’s decisive importance for the water supply of
neighbouring countries in the Middle East would be of considerable
additional value.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly pointed out
that Turkey has to undergo sweeping reforms for its own sake, not
just to “please Brussels”. This is a fair and far-sighted judgement. But
there can be no doubt that the realistic prospect of EU membership
and the concomitant need to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria
by December 2004 to ensure the start of accession negotiations
served as catalyst for the reform process undertaken by the Turkish
Government in recent years.
Progress achieved to date through a large number of
constitutional amendments and eight legislative “harmonisation
packages” is indeed impressive. The measures taken include the
abolition of the death penalty, safeguards against torture and ill-
treatment, and a reform of the prison system. With regard to
freedom of expression, association and the media, several 
notorious laws that cost journalists, scholars and human rights
activists their freedom have been repealed, draconian restrictions
lifted and provisions introduced ensuring greater accountability 
and transparency. The State Security Courts that have been a source
of systematic violations of human rights were abolished altogether.
In this context, an important measure concerns the recognition by
Turkey of the precedence of international human rights legislation
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In general, it is to be expected that Turkish accession would lead
to stronger EU policies on the South, adding to the “Northern
Dimension” initiated by Finland a new and powerful “Southern
Dimension”. This should not be seen as a danger, but rather as an
opportunity. The argument sometimes heard that Turkish
membership would draw Europe into the conflicts of the Middle
East is unconvincing. Developments in this turbulent region already
have profound repercussions on Europe’s stability and security,
whether or not the EU has direct borders with countries like Iraq,
Iran and Syria. Turkey, with its pivotal position at the heart of the
Eurasian region and as a western pillar of the wider Middle East,
can be of indisputable benefit to European action in this area.
For the emerging European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), Turkey’s considerable military capabilities and the country’s
potential as a forward base would be important and much-needed
assets. Over the years Turkey has made considerable contributions to
international peacekeeping operations, including
those in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Kosovo, and has participated in the EU-led military
and police missions in Macedonia (FYROM). Until
December 2002 it led the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Turkey’s
agreement to the comprehensive deal reached in 2002
on EU-NATO relations allowed co-operation in military crisis
management, lifting obstacles to the implementation of the “Berlin
Plus”agenda.
Furthermore, Turkey has actively participated in the work of the
Convention to the Future of Europe with a view to contributing on
the improvement of ESDP’s efficiency and capabilities to meet the
international security challenges of today. As one of the strongest
NATO partners, with a clear orientation toward ESDP, Turkey would
be of great value for the European defence system. Meanwhile, with
regard to new threats to security and stability like international
terrorism, organised crime, trade in human beings and illegal
migration, Turkey’s EU membership would result in closer and
mutually beneficial cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.
In addition to enhancing the Union’s role in the political and
security field, Turkey could add in no small way to Europe’s
economic weight in the world. Even if the Turkish economy will
continue to suffer deficiencies and imbalances for some time to
come, it has great potential. The country is large, has substantial
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ongoing efforts towards accommodation. In this context the impact
for the stability of the whole region of the fate of Kurds in Turkey on
the one hand, and in neighbouring states like Iraq on the other must
also be kept in mind.
Although solving the Cyprus problem is not a precondition for
opening accession negotiations with Turkey, early reunification of
the island would have given Turkish aspirations a considerable boost.
The constructive attitude of the Turkish Government and its strong
support for the efforts of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan have
been widely noted. Whatever turn developments in Cyprus may take
in the coming years, it could confidently be predicted that at the
latest, Turkey’s accession to the EU would see the island’s division
brought to an end.
Turkey’s relations with Greece have continued to improve over
recent years, and Greece now supports Turkish EU membership.
Efforts to solve a number of contentious bilateral issues are
underway, and exploratory talks are being held between the two
foreign ministries on the disputes in the Aegean Sea.
It is likely that the opening of accession negotiations
with Turkey would greatly facilitate the search for
solutions here. Equally, Turkey’s rapprochement to
the EU should have beneficial effects on relationships
with other neighbouring states. In particular with
regard to Armenia, it is to be hoped that the opening
of borders and an improvement in bilateral relations may become
possible, including Turkey’s recognition of the tragic events of the
past in the spirit of European reconciliation.
In view of the tremendous efforts undertaken by the Turkish
Government and society to adapt to European standards in all their
aspects, there is a widespread expectation that by year’s end an
irreversible step towards EU membership will be taken. A negative
decision by the European Council would be considered as
confirming Turkey’s deeply rooted perception of rejection by
Europe, with less-than-perfect compliance with membership criteria
serving as an excuse for the real reason: religious and cultural
differences. Erosion of public support and the likely emergence of
a more visible opposition to EU membership could decisively
weaken the Erdogan government and bring the transformation
process to a halt. At the same time, it should be evident that Turkey
does not possess a viable alternative to integration with Europe. The
possibility of a grand alliance with the countries of Central Asia or
20
over national laws, and of judgements by the European Court for
Human Rights as basis for retrials before Turkish Courts.
Progress has been made in streamlining public administration
and government, in strengthening the role of parliament, promoting
gender equality and upgrading religious rights and freedoms. The
duties, powers and functioning of the National Security Council
(NSC) have been substantially amended, bringing the framework 
of civil-military relations closer to accepted practice in EU member
states. These and related measures, including full parliamentary
control over military expenditures, should further reduce military
interference in the political processes of the country.
The lifting of the state of emergency that curtailed basic liberties
in the Southeast for 25 years has led to a remarkable improvement in
the quality of life of Kurds living in that region. The legalisation of
radio and TV broadcasts and of education in languages other than
Turkish and greater tolerance of cultural activities of minority
groups should also have beneficial effects on interethnic relations.
It can be fairly said that Turkey has achieved more reform in just
over two years than in the whole of the previous decade. The political
and legal system of the country has changed profoundly. In
recognition of this, and of the broad progress made in democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe decided at its recent spring session to end the
monitoring procedure applied to Turkey since 1996. Beyond these
achievements, however, determined efforts are necessary in order to
ensure the effective implementation of the new legislation in all state
structures and all parts of the country. In particular with regard to
the rule of law, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and civil-
military relations, legislative measures have to translate into a change
of mentalities and conduct on the part of all concerned. The
Monitoring Group set up by the government is playing a useful role
to this end. Equally, continued European engagement and
monitoring by the European Commission are of vital importance 
for the reform process to be followed through.
Kurdish citizens of Turkey have greatly benefited from reform
measures, and are therefore among the strongest advocates of
Turkish EU membership. A failure of the accession process would
mean a serious setback for the aspirations of the mainstream of
Turkish Kurds to find a proper and satisfactory place in their
homeland. It would play into the hands of radical groups intent 
on preventing – through violence – the successful conclusion of
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the Black Sea region is mere illusion. It is for this reason that Turkey’s
political class and society have consistently put their focus on
Europe. If Turkish hopes are disappointed, an advance of ultra-
nationalist as well as Islamist currents should be expected and a
revival of violence in the Kurdish populated regions would be likely
leading to increased instability and the return of the military
establishment to a more assertive role.
Turkey is large, poor and Muslim. These three factors turn Turkey’s
accession to the EU into a major challenge, raising anxieties and
resistance in many parts of Europe.
If membership negotiations were to begin in 2005, and assuming
that they would be difficult and lengthy, Turkey’s accession could
become possible in about ten years at the earliest. By then both the
Union and Turkey will have undergone major changes. In 2015
the EU is likely to have at least 28 members (including Bulgaria,
Romania and Croatia), the status of the other Balkan states
depending on political and economic developments in the region.
Constitutional arrangements allowing European institutions to
better adapt to the needs of an enlarged membership will be in place,
and the end of the 2007-2013 budget period will have provided the
opportunity to assess and possibly modify the Union’s regional and
agricultural policies in the light of experiences with the new member
states.
Turkey, meanwhile, will have deepened and widened its
transformation, for a successful conclusion of the accession
negotiations will rely on all the membership criteria being fulfilled.
It is expected that the opening of negotiations will give a strong
boost to the Turkish economy, improving the country’s comparative
position with EU countries and in particular with the new members.
Despite a declining birth rate, Turkey’s population will reach over
eighty million by 2015, almost equal to Germany’s and forming
about 14% of the EU’s new population total.
III The Challenges













Much has been said about the risk of Turkey’s accession leading
to the end of the political Union and the vision of a United Europe.
It is certainly true that the membership of a large Muslim country,
in a unique geopolitical position and with strong interests in regions
like Central Asia, South Caucasus and the Middle East, will alter the
Union’s profile and influence its foreign policy orientation. As far as
the fundamental question of “finalité Europeenne” is concerned,
however, the fact is that the European project has changed with 
every enlargement round, including and in particular the first in
1973, when Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the European
Community.
The tight political union which in time might have become a
reality among the six founding countries is hard to envisage for a
heterogeneous group such as the present membership of twenty-five,
desirable as this vision may remain for many ardent Europeans. It is a
matter for argument whether deep divisions among member states
on the future of the Union can best be overcome by a system of
integration at different speeds or by continuing the pragmatic,
hesitant approach which over the past decades has moved the
process forward in a steady, if often frustratingly slow manner. In this
context, Turkish accession – on top of that of the ten new members –
may well add to the complications in finding consensus solutions,
but it will hardly bring about a qualitative change in the basic
discourse.
Judging from Turkey’s performance in other international
organisations, it can be expected to display a responsible and
cooperative attitude in European institutions, at the same time
pursuing its interests with vigour and determination. As a candidate
country Turkey has been particularly careful to conduct a foreign
policy compatible with EU positions. This was acknowledged by the
European Commission in its Progress Report 2003, which states that
“Turkey has continued to position its foreign and security policy in
line with that of the European Union”and that it “has played a
constructive role within the framework of the CFSP”. Nevertheless,
it is in this field that Turkey could have the strongest impact,
strengthening the Union’s focus on regions in its southeast
neighbourhood included in the Union’s new Wider Europe concept
because of their vital importance for Europe’s security.
As for the financial costs of Turkish accession, it is impossible 
at this stage to make concrete predictions.Various recently published
projections have been based on current EU policies and the present
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In view of many uncertainties for the Union and Turkey, it is
difficult to predict with accuracy what implication Turkish
membership would have for the functioning of European institutions,
the project of political union and the financial policies of the Union.
It is obvious that institutional arrangements based on population
would give Turkey considerable weight on a par with the present 
“big four”(Germany, France, Britain, Italy). This is true in particular
for the European Parliament, where Turkey is expected to be allocated
a similar number of seats as Germany. However, the impact of this
large representation would be much reduced by the fact that voting 
in the European Parliament normally follows party lines rather than
the national positions of member states.
As for voting in the European Council, the new constitutional
treaty’s double majority system requires in most cases 55% of the
membership representing 65% of the EU’s population to pass a
decision. This strikes a fine balance between the principle of equality
of member states and the recognition of their different demographic
weight. Turkey would have the same standing as Luxembourg or
Malta in the first tier of the voting system and that of Germany and
the other big countries in the second, giving it considerable leverage
especially for forming blocking minorities.
On the other hand, the continuation of the consensus principle
in important areas of EU action, in particular common foreign and
security policy, defence policy and fiscal policy, diminishes the
relevance of the population size of member states for the Union’s
decision-making process. Turkey’s accession is unlikely to have any
impact on the composition of the European Commission, since by
that time the decision on a reduced number of Commissioners and
the introduction of rotation on an equal basis should have been
implemented.
With regard to the three dominant axes in the EU – large 
versus small states, poor versus rich and federalists versus
intergovernmentalists – Turkey’s impact is easier to predict.
It would strengthen the group of big countries, redressing somewhat
the balance, which continued to shift with the accession of smaller
states in previous enlargement rounds. Because of its weak economy,
Turkey’s entry would result in a lowering of average economic
standards in the Union, making the EU as a whole poorer and raising
demands on the richer member states. Finally, Turkey is expected to
support the intergovernmental approach, favouring a continuation of














There is no denying that in parts of Turkish society, traditional
practices abusive to women and girls continue. They include
domestic violence, "crimes of honour", arranged marriages and
inadequate schooling for girls, resulting in female illiteracy and the
exclusion of women from jobs and healthcare. As the Co-
Rapporteurs of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments by Member States of the Council
of Europe indicated in their report earlier this year,
there appears to be a great divide between modern
and traditional Turkey and between West and East as
far as women’s rights are concerned. Nearly 95% of
the crimes of honour recorded are committed in
eastern and south-eastern Turkey, where the suicide rate among
women – apparently imposed as an alternative to murder by a 
family member or to escape a forced marriage – is twice as high as
elsewhere. Certainly, this situation is intolerable in a modern state
and cannot be justified by social and cultural traditions or a region’s
lack of economic development.
On the positive side, the Turkish authorities have pledged
firmness in totally eliminating such practices belonging to another
age. A number of legal provisions favouring their continuation have
been revoked by Parliament. "Honour killings" and other problems
confronting woman are intensely debated in the media and in
society, hopefully preparing the ground for a change of attitudes in
all parts of the country.
As far as the political role of Islam is concerned, the nature of
the secular system imposed by Ataturk after the foundation of the
Turkish Republic should be properly understood. His concept may
have been inspired by the French principle of ‘laïcité’, but it in no 
way means a separation of church and state as practised in France.
In Turkey, secularism signifies the relegation of religious beliefs to
the private sphere and the elimination of the Koranic laws from
public life. Islamic institutions remain under state control; the
government oversees religious facilities and education, regulates 
the operation of mosques and charitable religious foundations,
including schools, hospitals and orphanages, and employs local 
and provincial imams as civil servants.
After the adoption of a multi-party system in 1946 and the
representation of political Islam in that system, the debate on the 
role of religion in the Turkish state became more intense and
acrimonious, leading to political tensions, the intervention of the
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performance of the Turkish economy, and are therefore highly
speculative. The nature and amount of transfers to Turkey would
depend on a number of changing factors, including the EU’s regional
and agricultural policies and the budgetary provisions in place at the
time of accession. It is likely that the Union’s budget will be capped at
somewhere between the present 1.24% of EU GDP and the 1%
proposed by six major contributing states, making an “explosion”of
the budget impossible. In addition, the restriction of transfers to a
maximum of 4% of the recipient country’s GDP – considered the
limit of absorption capacity – may continue to apply. Finally, in the
light of the increasing requirements of new member states, it is an
open question to what extent the principle of solidarity will continue
to be applied as before in the Union.
On the Turkish side, much will depend on the country’s
economic development over the next ten years. Many experts believe
the confidence generated by accession negotiations would bring
immediate benefits, including an inflow of foreign direct investment,
sustained growth rates of 5% to 6% and the elimination of the
periodic crises that have plagued the Turkish economy. On the 
other hand, Turkey’s large agricultural sector will remain a serious
problem despite its continuing steady contraction, as will the many
regional imbalances and disparities between urban and rural areas.
In view of the many imponderables connected with the financial
implications of Turkish membership, the only prediction that can
reasonably be made at this time is that Turkey would be a candidate
for considerable assistance. The details would however depend on
the circumstances prevailing at the time of entry and on the outcome
of the accession negotiations.
The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership causes considerable
discomfort among many Europeans because of its large and
predominantly Muslim population, often perceived as the bearers of
alien social and cultural traditions. Further, it is feared that political
Islam, making full use of the democratic system and unrestrained by
a military establishment diminished in its influence, could come to
power in Turkey and thereby gain control of an important EU
member state.
The Muslim factor
















The approaching decision on accession negotiations with Turkey has
caused strong reactions in many parts of Europe, from both public
opinion and political leaderships. While in some countries the
general attitude towards Turkish membership seems favourable,
clear opposition is articulated in others. However, reliable opinion
polls have been conducted on the issue in only a few countries, and
no comprehensive overview of peoples’ attitudes and motivations
across the EU as a whole is available. In particular, little is known
about currents of opinion in the new member states. Their
governments are following a cautious line, opting to await the
Commission’s forthcoming report and recommendation before
taking a position.
Having said this, scepticism seems to be strongest in countries
with a substantial Turkish minority, especially in Germany, France,
Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium. This indicates that Turkey is
seen through the prism of experience of Turkish immigrants, who
often find it difficult to integrate into the societies of host countries.
The main factors determining negative attitudes towards Turkey’s
EU membership are “cultural differences” including the religious
dimension, the size of the country’s population and the fear of a
flood of new immigrants. More prosaically, there is little inclination
to accept additional financial burdens in order to bring Turkey’s
economy up to European standards.
Should the European Council approve accession negotiations in
December, a rift between government policy and public opinion
could deepen in some countries. While this divide would not directly
affect the negotiations, it could develop into a serious problem by the
time an eventual accession treaty came to be ratified. In the
intervening time, considerable effort should be applied by the
governments concerned, the European Commission and Turkey
itself to address legitimate concerns but also misconceptions and
anxieties, so as to turn public opinion around.
The real European perspective offered to Turkey by the European
Council in 1999 and 2002, combined with the landslide victory of
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in November 2002 and 
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military and the banning of ‘Islamist’ parties. The argument was in
essence between Islamists advocating a more visible role of religion
in public life as something only normal in a Muslim country and as 
a democratic right, and secularists considering such demands as
attempting to establish a theocratic state and as a serious threat to the
founding principle of the Turkish Republic.
In view of Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union,
it is legitimate to ask how strongly rooted secularism has become in
Turkish society 80 years after its inception, and whether there is any
real danger that Turkey’s political system could be transformed
through democratic processes in a manner incompatible with
European standards.
A survey published in 2000 and conducted by TESEV, Turkey’s
leading think tank, confirms the assurances of the Turkish
Government and of many representatives of civil society that the
secular system has the overwhelming support of the country’s
population. In particular, the majority of people considered
themselves as devout Muslims, striving to fulfil the obligations of
their religion, without believing that religion should play a role in
political life. The study also reveals strong conservative currents,
mainly on gender issues and their direct relationship with education:
as the level of education increases, radical expressions of religiosity
and conservatism decrease and modern civic values gain in
importance. As far as identity is concerned, most people identify
themselves first as Turks and only then as Muslims.
There can be no doubt that, as in any democracy, the risk of
radical groups misusing the Turkish democratic process for their
purposes cannot be totally excluded. On the other hand, Turkey’s
secular system appears to be firmly rooted in society, as is the
orientation of the country towards Europe and the West. The
completion of the Government’s reform process, progressive
modernisation and the anchoring of Turkey in the union of
European democracies would therefore be the best way to bring
about a change of mentalities in more backward parts of society 
and to safeguard Turkey’s secular political system.
Public Opinion





















the overwhelming support for EU membership on the part of the
Turkish people, have opened a window of opportunity for reforms
which is being fully used by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government. It is
nonetheless reasonable to assume that such far-reaching changes in
Turkey’s political and legal system affecting a variety of vested
interests, as well as the profound transformation of Turkish society,
are resented in many quarters. Opposition to EU accession, or rather
to the reforms necessary to attain it, cannot be discounted.
Nationalists, Islamists, parts of the civilian and military
establishment and traditional Kemalists have surely not given up
their resistance, and are just biding their time.
Public support cannot be taken for granted either. Recent
surveys show that around 75% of the electorate would vote in favour
of accession if a referendum were to be held at this time, the principal
motive being the expectation of important economic benefits.
Somewhat in contradiction, however, answers to other questions
indicate the persistence of a strong Euroscepticism among Turkish
people. Anxieties concern the possible loss of national and religious
identity, erosion of traditional values and the weakening of Turkish
independence and sovereignty. Moreover, there is a widespread fear
of being excluded by Europe and a perception that much harsher
membership conditions are being imposed on Turkey than on other
candidates.
To prevent a reversal of public opinion and to allow the reform
process to move forward, it is therefore of vital importance that the
momentum of Turkey’s advance towards membership of the
European Union be maintained. A decision by the European Council
in December to set an early date for the opening of
accession negotiations would go a long way to dispel
lingering doubts about Europe’s real intentions and
about the sweeping changes in Turkish society. At 
the same time, public opinion in Turkey must be
made aware that – as in previous accession processes – 
the start of negotiations will not end the need 
for transformation. Rather, it will require reform efforts to be 
intensified and extended to areas like the economy. The EU will
continue to closely  monitor progress until the decision on accession
is finally taken.
As in previous accession
processes the start 
of negotiations will 
not end the need for
transformation
The number of Turkish migrants living in the countries of the
European Union today is estimated at 3.8 million, with the majority
(2.6 million) in Germany and substantial groups in France, the
Netherlands, Austria and Belgium. Large-scale immigration from
Turkey dates back to the 1960s and the early 1970s, when European
governments, driven by a shortage of labour, introduced guest-
worker programmes; many of the temporarily employed Turkish
workers settled permanently in the large cities of their host
countries. Since then immigration policies have become more
restrictive. Turkish migration flows into EU countries were
drastically reduced, becoming limited mainly to family reunification
and migration through marriage, alongside a number of asylum
seekers from Turkey after the military coup of 1980 and as a
consequence of the Kurdish problem.
Most Turkish immigrants were unskilled workers from rural
areas of Anatolia, having to overcome the double shock of moving
from country to city and from their homeland to a foreign
environment. This in part explains the difficulties many of them
encountered in integrating into the society of their host country.
Moreover, migrants’ destinations depended primarily on network
effects, leading to strong concentrations of Turkish immigrants in
specific areas and often to the settlement of workers in clusters
according to their localities of origin. Especially for the first
generation of immigrants these factors, combined with a feeling of
economic and social exclusion, favoured the establishment of ethnic
and religious enclaves characterised by family-based structures, the
preservation of the native language and a strong adherence to
religious believes and cultural traditions. Islamic organisations and
community associations have become an important factor in
providing Turkish immigrants with a sense of belonging and





















including relative income levels, prospects of employment and
economic opportunities, foreign demand for labour and the
development of European countries’ migration policies over the
coming years. Migration to Turkey from neighbouring countries and
the related Turkish legal requirements could also be of
relevance. There is a possibility that, in line with the
practice in previous enlargement rounds, long
transition periods would be negotiated with Turkey
delaying full application of the freedom of movement
of people for a number of years after accession.
Moreover, Turkey’s birth rate has sharply fallen over
the years. The total fertility rate (average children per woman) stands
at 2.5, down from 3.5 in the 1970s, and is expected to decline further
as economic prosperity increases. This trend is also supported by
Turkey's population growth rate which has fallen to 1.4% according
to the latest UN figures.
Given the many uncertainties involved, estimates of the
migration potential from Turkey vary considerably, the most
frequent forecast being of 2.7 million people in the long term.
This would represent a relatively modest 0.5% of the EU’s total
population. However, the destination of migrants is not expected to
be evenly distributed among EU member states; those countries with
large Turkish communities like Germany may well receive the major
share of migration flows. Future Turkish migration is likely to
include more professional and better-educated people, reducing the
integration difficulties encountered by the unskilled immigrants of
the past. Finally, Turkish EU membership could lead to greater
mobility among migrants, many moving back and forth and others
deciding to return to Turkey for good as its economy grows and
prospers in the EU.
Table 1 contains a projection of demographic developments in
Turkey and selected EU countries. Table 2 shows actual Turkish
population in major EU immigration countries. The figures suggest
that in view of decreasing populations in European countries, the
relatively modest immigration expected from Turkey would not only
be sustainable – it could constitute one of the positive economic
impacts of Turkish accession.
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identity, maintaining at the same time extensive cultural, political
and commercial ties with the country of origin.
Judging by the experience of the large community of Euro-
Turks in Germany, immigrants are by no means a homogenous
group; attitudes vary considerably. Many Turks in Germany have
shown willingness to incorporate themselves into the political,
economic and social system of their new home country. More than a
third have acquired citizenship, with many more planning to apply.
Over the years, an emerging middle class of Euro-Turks has engaged
entrepreneurially in sectors like services, tourism, catering,
telecommunications and construction. Others are affiliated with
political parties and participate in their activities on local and
national level. As a general rule, integration takes place in the second
or third generation and can be measured by indicators such as
increased mastery of the local language, better performance at
school, improved position on the socio-economic ladder, rise in
“mixed”marriages, decline in birth rate and decrease in religious
practices.
In most European countries the capacity of the Turkish
community to integrate is not judged by the many immigrants who
succeed, but by those who fail. It is they who become the triggers for
discomfort and anxiety, with complaints ranging from poor
educational performance, high unemployment and alienation from
the broader society to the isolation of woman, wearing of the veil,
forced marriages and "honour killings". Much of this behaviour is
attributed to Islam and religious tradition. It deepens latent anti-
immigrant feelings, in any case aggravated by 9/11 and other
instances of fundamentalist terrorism.
On the positive side, there is growing awareness among
governments and civil society that integration is a two-way street.
Just as immigrants have to make an effort to integrate, host
governments must adopt policies to help their integration. Even
more important, society itself has to change, reconsidering attitudes
and perceptions bordering on xenophobia (if not outright racism).
The fine line between integration and assimilation needs to be better
understood. Requiring immigrants to adopt common universal
values does not necessitate depriving them of their culture and
religious freedoms.
The effect of Turkey’s EU accession on migration is difficult to
forecast. It will depend on several factors: demographic
developments in Turkey and the EU, the economic situation at home
Immigration from 
Turkey could constitute
























































































Table 2: Turkish Population in EU countries (thousands) 





































For a country of 70 million people, Turkey’s GDP is modest and its
per capita income comparatively low, just approaching that of
Bulgaria and Romania. (see also Table 3)
In this context, existing disparities of regional income present a
serious problem, causing large-scale migration flows inside Turkey.
The Marmara (Istanbul) region has a population of 17.3 million and
a per capita income standing at 153% of the Turkish average; the 9
million people of the Aegean region earn 130% of the average
income, Central Anatolia has 11.6 million people earning 97% of
average income, while East Anatolia’s 8.1 million people have the
lowest income, at 28% of the average.
The large agricultural sector employs 32.8% of the Turkish
workforce, but places a heavy burden on the country’s taxpayers. In
the past, price support and various subsidies lowering the costs of
inputs such as capital, fertilisers, seeds, pesticides and water have
resulted in transfers to farmers amounting to about 5% of GDP.
The total support to agriculture, including higher prices paid by
consumers is estimated at 8% of GDP. In view of WTO requirements,
the IMF programme and the prospect of EU accession, Turkish
agricultural policy is now gradually being reformed. Price supports
and subsidies will be phased out and replaced by direct payments to
farmers based on land holdings. Import tariffs will be reduced, and
state enterprises in the agricultural sector privatised. If the reforms
are brought to completion, Turkey will have an agricultural policy
similar to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Turkey’s foreign trade has been rising steadily over recent years,
reflecting the continuing economic recovery and the ongoing
reorientation of industry towards export markets. EU countries were
the most important trading partners, accounting for 52% of exports
and 46% of imports. In parallel with the increase of trade volume,
Turkey’s foreign trade deficit widened substantially, partially offset
by the strong performance of the services sector (in particular
tourism, with a record high of 14 million foreign visitors in 2003).
Due to the small size of its economy – at present less than 2% of
the EU’s GDP – Turkey’s accession would have a minimal impact on
the EU economy. For Turkey, on the other hand, the consequences
would be significant and highly beneficial. According to estimates,
full access to the internal market, including for agricultural products
not covered by the Customs Union of 1996, and the elimination of
administrative and technical trade barriers could lead to bilateral
trade increasing by around 40%. An improved investment climate
Turkey’s long history of macroeconomic instability culminated in
the 2001 financial crisis, the causes of which were poor public
finance management and a fragile banking system. It led to a fall of
7.5% in Turkish GDP, interest rates reaching 400%, a large currency
devaluation and public debt soaring to above 90% of GDP. For
Turkey’s economy this crisis was a serious setback; but it also showed
its resilience, dynamism and flexibility. Due to a far-reaching reform
programme backed by the International Monetary Fund, including a
clean-up of the banking system, independence of the Central Bank,
the closure of numerous extra-budgetary funds, flexible exchange
rates, tough fiscal policies and new legal frameworks for the energy
sector, agriculture, civil aviation and telecommunication, the
recovery was swift. Within a year growth resumed at over 7%,
inflation dropped significantly, the debt to GDP ratio declined, the
Turkish lira regained its value and the foundations for a sustainable
economic upturn were in place.
In spite of these positive developments, much remains to be
done to overcome the many deficiencies and imbalances from which
the Turkish economy continues to suffer. Public debt and the
government budget deficit are still high, at 87.4% and 8.8% of GDP
respectively: well above the targets of the Maastricht Criteria. So are
interest rates, with inflation standing at 18.4% at the end of 2003
(although it continued its steady decline into 2004), whereas
unemployment at 10.8% corresponds to the European average.
At less than 1% of GDP, the remarkably low level of foreign direct
investment can be attributed to Turkey’s macroeconomic volatility
and political uncertainties, but also to an adverse institutional














made possible by the anchoring of the Turkish economy to a stable
system would give a strong impetus to both domestic and foreign
investment, resulting in job creation and a higher level of economic
growth.
Judging from the past experiences of accession countries, much
of the benefit of future EU membership would already begin to
accrue with the opening of negotiations. Moreover, the accession
process would motivate the Turkish Government to continue
institutional and structural reforms and to maintain a rigorous
economic regime in close cooperation with the EU and IMF. Present
economic risks and political uncertainties would thus be reduced,
and confidence in the sustainable stability of the Turkish economy
strengthened.
Table 3 compares Turkey’s economic performance with two of the
present candidate countries, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the
EU-10 (new member states) and EU-25. The comparison is based on
data for the year 2003. The performance was excellent in terms of
longer-term growth (2003 over 1995), with respect to trade deficit,
which was relatively low, and the current account, which was almost
balanced. The latter fact is remarkable and indicates that Turkey’s
relatively high overall price level (at 50% of the EU average) did not
hurt the competitiveness of the real economy.
Turkey’s data with respect to the budget deficit and gross debt of
the public sector were significantly inferior, while unemployment
did not differ substantially from the other countries’ average.
Economic indicators in comparison
Economic performance indicators
GDP at exchange rates (ERs)
GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP)
per capita
GDP growth over 2002
GDP growth over 1995




Rate of inflation (consumer prices) at year-end
Relative price level
Labour market





Monthly compensation of employees at ERs
Monthly compensation of employees at PPP 
Foreign trade, current account and FDI
Exports of goods in % of GDP
Imports of goods in % of GDP
Balance of goods in % of GDP
Current account in % of GDP
































































































































Table 3: A comparison of economic indicators (year 2003)
ER Exchange rate
PPP Purchasing power parity
FDI Foreign direct investment
1 Turkey and EU: GDP concept i.e. including indirect labour costs; Bulgaria, Romania: Gross monthly
wages as reported in national statistics.
2 Excluding Malta and Cyprus. 
3 Year 2002.
Sources: wiiw database, AMECO, IMF, Eurostat, Employment in Europe 2003, European Commission:
Economic Forecast, Spring 2004.
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Table 4 compares Turkey’s economic situation in 2003 with that in
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovenia on the eve of their accession
negotiations (1999 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 1997 for Poland
and Slovenia). This approach allows us to compare the starting
conditions and indicates that Turkey’s position is not fundamentally
worse than those of the other countries. GDP per
capita at purchasing power parity, an important
measure for a country’s degree of development,
was between that of Bulgaria and Poland, although
half as high compared to Slovenia. The budget
deficit as a proportion of GDP was much higher in
Turkey compared to the other countries, whereas public debt was
high, but not substantially worse than in Bulgaria. Inflation was
much higher in Romania.
Employment figures show that the GDP share of agriculture was
very high in Turkey in 2003, but significantly lower compared to
Romania in 1999. Unemployment was also in a ‘normal’ range. With
regard to the current account, Turkey’s situation is better than it was
in Bulgaria, Poland and Romania in the year prior to the beginning
of negotiations. Finally with respect to foreign direct investment,
taken per capita, Turkey did not differ from the other countries.
These comparisons give the impression that from an economic
perspective, Turkey is certainly not a ‘strange animal’ in the company
of present and former candidate countries. Latest figures confirm the
positive trend of its economic indicators. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter has reported that in the first quarter of 2004, driven by
productivity improvements, Turkey’s real GDP was one of the 
fastest growing in the world, rising by 10.1% year on year. At the
same time, according to the Institute for Statistics, inflation fell by











Year preceding the start of accession negotiations
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parities)
GDP growth rate (at constant prices)
Public sector (consolidated): Budget surplus 
(EU-def.), in % of GDP
Public sector: gross debt (EU-def.), in % of GDP
Rate of inflation (consumer prices) at the year-end





Balance of goods in % of GDP
Current account in % of GDP

























































































Table 4: A comparison of economic starting conditions: 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Slovenia




Sources: wiiw databases, AMECO, IMF, Eurostat, Employment in Europe 2003, European Commission: Economic Forecast,
Spring 2004.
Latest figures confirm













accession negotiations, were not taken in full knowledge 
of all circumstances.
The decision the European Council is taking in December will
not be on Turkey’s membership of the EU, but on the opening of
accession negotiations. Their duration and outcome will depend on
progress made, in particular with regard to economic criteria and the
acquis communautaire. It is expected that this process
will take a long time, reflecting the scale of difficulties
faced by such a large and complex country and the
need for consolidation of the Union following the
accession of ten new member states. This interval will
present an opportunity for both sides to address the
most urgent problems and to mitigate any negative
effects Turkey’s accession could have. In other words,
by the time a final decision is taken both Turkey and the European
Union will have profoundly changed.
Turkey’s accession would offer considerable benefits both to the
European Union and to Turkey. For the Union, the unique
geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans, the
wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond, its
importance for the security of Europe’s energy supplies and its
political, economic and military weight would be great assets.
Moreover, as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the
European Union, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe’s
relations with the Islamic world.
For Turkey, EU accession would be the ultimate confirmation
that its century-old orientation towards the West was the right
choice, and that it is finally accepted by Europe. EU membership
would also ensure that the country’s transformation into a modern
democratic society has become irreversible, enabling Turkey to fully
exploit its rich human and economic resources.
A failure of the Turkish accession process would not only mean
the loss of important opportunities for both sides. It could result in a
serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading to political upheaval and




December will not be on
Turkey’s membership
but on the opening of
accession negotiations.
The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view that
accession negotiations should be opened as soon as Turkey fulfils the
Copenhagen political criteria. Further delay would damage the
European Union’s credibility and be seen as a breach of the generally
recognised principle that “pacta sunt servanda”(agreements are to
be honoured). Turkey, on the other hand, must accept that fulfilment
of the political criteria includes the implementation
of all legislation passed by parliament. Accession
criteria apply to all candidate countries alike and there
can be no shortcuts in individual cases. Equally,
fairness demands that no candidate state should be
submitted to more rigorous conditions than others. It is incumbent
on the European Commission to assess whether Turkey’s compliance
with the Copenhagen criteria has reached the critical mass necessary
to recommend opening accession negotiations.
As far as Turkey’s European credentials are concerned, Turkey is
a Euro-Asian country, its culture and history closely entwined with
Europe, with a strong European orientation and a European
vocation which has been accepted for decades by European
governments. In this, Turkey is fundamentally different from
countries of Europe’s neighbourhood in both North Africa and the
Middle East. Its accession to the European Union would therefore
not necessarily serve as a model for the Union’s relations with these
states. Any objections in principle against Turkey joining the
European integration process should have been raised in 1959 at the
time of Turkey’s first application, in 1987 when Turkey applied for
the second time, or in 1999 before Turkey was given candidate status.
No government can claim that these decisions, including the


















Turkey’s economy has traditionally been plagued by
macroeconomic instability and structural deficiencies, many of
which persist today. But the crisis of 2001 has shown the resilience of
the Turkish economy, leading to a swift recovery and to far-reaching
reforms of the institutional and regulatory frameworks. It is now of
vital importance that the Turkish Government persists with the
economic reform process in close cooperation with the International
Monetary Fund and the European Union.
In view of the country’s size, geographic location and young and
dynamic workforce Turkey’s economic potential is undeniable. It is
equally evident that EU membership would be highly beneficial for
the Turkish economy, providing a firm link to a stable system. The
opening of accession negotiations by itself would considerably
strengthen confidence in Turkey’s economic stability.
Migration pressure from Turkey, which raises concern in some
countries, would depend on several factors, including economic and
demographic developments in Turkey and the European Union. Free
movement of labour is likely to apply only after a long
transitional period, so that governments would retain
control of immigration for many years after Turkish
accession. Based on the experience of previous
enlargement rounds, migration flows from Turkey are
expected to be relatively modest, at a time when
declining and aging populations may be leading to 
a serious shortage of labour in many European countries, making
immigration vital to the continuation of present generous systems 
of social security.
Turkish eligibility for EU membership having been confirmed
on many occasions over the past decades, Turkey has every reason for
expecting to be welcome in the Union, provided it fulfils the relevant
conditions. The Independent Commission therefore feels strongly
that in dealing with this issue the European Union must treat Turkey




December will not be on
Turkey’s membership
but on the opening of
accession negotiations.
7In spite of its size and special characteristics, and although it
would unquestionably increase the Union’s heterogeneity as a
member, Turkey would be unlikely to fundamentally change the 
EU and the functioning of its institutions. Turkey’s
entry may accentuate existing divergences on the
future of the integration process, but it would not
cause a qualitative shift in the debate. It should be
borne in mind that the decision-making process in
the European Union is based on ever-changing
alliances, and that the political influence of member
states depends at least as much on economic power as on size or
demographic weight.
As far as the costs of Turkish membership are concerned, Turkey
is likely to require financial assistance from the European Union for
many years, the level of transfers depending on the EU’s financial
policies and the economic situation in Turkey at the time of
accession.
A considerable problem could develop in several European
countries in connection with the ratification of an accession treaty
with Turkey, should public resistance persist and government policy
continue to diverge from popular opinion. This issue must be
addressed in a common effort by governments concerned, Turkey
and the European Commission.
The best answer to the fears in parts of Europe about Turkey’s
different religious and cultural traditions and perceptions of a
danger that Turkey could become a fundamentalist Muslim state is to
ensure the continuation of the ongoing transformation process, and
to protect Turkey’s long-standing secular political system by firmly
anchoring Turkey in the union of European democracies.
Unprecedented reform efforts undertaken by the Turkish
Government and substantial support for EU membership in Turkish
public opinion should not hide the enormous task that the ongoing
and far-reaching transformation of the country’s legal, political and
societal system represents for Turkey. It would be wrong to
underestimate the latent resistance to such profound changes in
many parts of Turkish society. Sustaining the reform process will to 
a large degree depend on whether the momentum of Turkey’s
accession process can be maintained.
5
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Turkey would be unlikely
to fundamentally 
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PartnersAnnex
The ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ ( from the Conclusions of the
Copenhagen European Council, June 21-22, 1993):
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of
political, economic and monetary union.
“The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an
important consideration in the general interest of both the Union
and the candidate countries.”
 
